Golden State Supremes to Decide If Government May Pay Contingent Fee to Lawyers
Kimberly Kralowec at The UCL Practitioner has the story and links here.
Kimberly Kralowec at The UCL Practitioner has the story and links here.
In Bleak House (1852-53), the cost of litigation exhausted the Jarndyce estate.
In The Washington Post today, business columnist Steven Pearlstein offers a contrarian take on the capping of punitive damages as a matter of federal common law in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219 (U.S. June 25, 2008). (Blawgletter post here.) In "Altering the Economics of Civil Litigation", Mr. Pearlstein opines that "the problem with court's decision in the Exxon case is not that it went too far in trying to reform the civil justice system, but that it didn't go far enough."
He explains that the Court did a good thing in Exxon Shipping but that the Justices should also rein in defense-side abuses:
[I]t ought to be equally offensive to our sense of justice that corporate defendants are routinely allowed to manipulate the judicial process with an endless stream of motions, depositions and appeals, many as frivolous as anything served up by the plaintiff's bar. For years, federal and state judges have turned a blind eye to this obvious and rampant abuse of process, which rivals anything conjured up by Charles Dickens in his famous novel, "Bleak House." Symbolically, the case of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker is to 21st-century jurisprudence what Dickens' Jarndyce v. Jarndyce was to the 19th century.
By limiting abusive punitive damage awards without limiting the abusive tactics of the corporate defense bar, Justice Souter and his colleagues have fundamentally altered the economics of civil litigation and slammed the courthouse door on average citizens with legitimate claims against big and negligent corporations.
To which Blawgletter says, on this Independence Day, amen.
The Ninth Circuit -- per Chief Judge Alex Kozinski -- yesterday upheld a class action complaint alleging securities fraud. The opinion aptly described the feat as "something much harder now than in days gone by." Whiting v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc., No. 06-15454 (9th Cir. June 5, 2008).
The complaint alleged that Applied Signal kept reporting a big "backlog" even after its biggest customer, the federal government, ordered it to quit work under four separate contracts. The stop-work orders cut ongoing revenues by 25 percent and portended cancellation of the contracts. But Applied didn't disclose the orders and even continued to report the work under the rubric of "uncompleted portions of existing contracts". When the truth outed, Applied's stock took a 16 percent tumble.
A CBS Outdoor (formerly Viacom) railroad trestle sign.
A federal jury awarded two billboard companies, Craig Outdoor and Midwest Outdoor, $125,000 each in tort damages against Viacom for swiping billboard sites that it tricked them into identifying. Acting as agent for several railroads, Viacom asked for applications to build the big signs on rights of way and in the applications required the hopefuls to specify the locations they wanted. But Viacom planned to take the best sites for itself and, after it got them, used false excuses for the railroads' refusals of the applicants' entreaties. The jury looked unkindly on Viacom's scheme and topped off the compensatory awards with punitives ones of $1,044,445 apiece. Craig Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Viacom Outdoor, Inc., No. 06-3335 (8th Cir. June 4, 2008).
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the eight-times multiple over Viacom's due process objection:
Although a ratio of actual to punitive damages in excess of eight to one may be constitutionally suspect, "there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). We conclude that in this case, given Viacom's deceitful conduct directed at Plaintiffs, the single-digit multiplier comports with due process.
Id., slip op. at 25 (footnote omitted). The court also rejected Viacom's argument that it set a 4:1 ratio as the upper constitutional limit in commercial cases. Id. at 25 n.9 (distinguishing Eden Electric, Ltd. v. Amana Co., 370 F.3d 824, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1150 (2005)).
Our feed believes we'll never see a billboard lovely as a tree. Even from a train.
A federal judge today sentenced Melvyn Weiss to 30 months in prison, Bloomberg reports. Mr. Weiss must also pay a $250,000 fine and forfeit another $9.75 million.
The sentencing comes two months after the former name partner in Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach pleaded guilty to participating in a racketeering conspiracy.
Bloomberg also notes that, according to an article by Nathan Koppel in The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Weiss's former firm -- which now goes by Milberg LLP -- may soon resolve its own troubles stemming from the imbroglio. Mr. Koppel reports that Milberg "is in advanced talks with prosecutors to settle the charges against it by admitting wrongdoing and paying a fine in the neighborhood of $75 million, according to people familiar with the talks. If the sides can not strike a deal, Milberg, which has so far denied wrongdoing, is due to stand trial in August."
Former partners in the firm, Bill Lerach, David Bershad, and Steven Schulman, pleaded guilty earlier.
People come up all the time -- usually lawyers but sometimes small children too -- and ask "Blawgletter, what else will come out this Term from the U.S. Supreme Court?" (The tykes say "Mr. Blawgletter".) "Having to do with business law, I mean", they clarify.
Fancy that! As if Mr. Blawgletter has time to track the doings (and not-doings) of what Jeffrey Toobin calls The Nine.
"Ah", you note -- that adorable twinkle in your voice. "You wrote a preview about one case, Klein & Co. Futures v. Board of Trade, No. 06-1265; a post on Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219 and another one on District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290; and a dadburn amicus brief in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity, No. 07-210."
True enough. We apparently do have time. Or at least inclination. So let's do have a quick look at what, bidness law-wise, the Court will do by the end-of-Term later this month (calendar here):
Standing for assignees. In Sprint Communications v. APCC Services, Inc., No. 07-552, payphone owners found a nifty way to sue -- or, more accurately, not to sue -- telephone companies that they believed shortchanged them (on payments for customers' use of the payphones for toll-free calls). They achieved not suing by assigning their claims "for purposes of collection" to companies that agreed to serve as plaintiffs. The owners retained the right to any cash the plaintiffs got in the lawsuit.
The question before the Court asks whether plaintiffs that "have no personal stake in the case" and "avowedly litigate only 'on behalf of' the assignors" have standing. If they don't, claimants will have to find another way to prosecute their claims -- presumably by doing it themselves.
Punies for Exxon Valdez disaster. The Exxon Shipping case posits limits on punitive damages under maritime law. An Alaska jury awarded fishermen $5 billion -- almost 250 times the compensatory damages -- which the Ninth Circuit cut to $2.5 billion. Does the award still punish Exxon too much? In view of the fact that the Exxon CEO wasn't on the bridge when the Valdez ran aground, should Exxon get any punishment at all?
Reliance for RICO? The Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act requires a civil plaintiff to prove harm "by reason of" any of a hundred or so crimes. The Court has interpreted the phrase as creating a "proximate cause" element. A common predicate offense under RICO, mail fraud, doesn't demand that anybody relied on the fraud; a mere attempt suffices. But does a mail fraud RICO claim import a reliance element? And if it does must the plaintiff herself do the relying? The Court will tell us when it rules in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity.
Exhausting those patents. The doctrine of patent exhaustion holds that a patent holder can't sue an infringer that buys an infringing product from the patent holder's licensee. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., No. 06-937, involves a variation on the "first sale" doctrine: Does it matter that the patent holder's license expressly reserved the right to sue the licensees' customers for infringement?
The Court dismissed the Klein case, which involved a claim under the Commodities Exchange Act, apparently because it settled. The Heller suit concerns whether the second amendment trumps a District of Columbia ban on handguns and doesn't directly implicate business law -- unless you buy and sell them or use them for protection or, ahem, to aid in debt-collection activities. So we'll leave that one alone. For now.
With the market price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil hovering just above $125 a barrel and regular gasoline prices spiking above $4.00 a gallon, your ordinary American citizen wants to know who to blame. Count Blawgletter as one of them.
We can speculate about causes. Does the lack of new refineries in the U.S. explain the price inflation? If so, can't we blame environmental extremism (and federal law) for making the cost of anti-pollution measures prohibitively expensive? Nah. According to the Energy Information Administration, which uses government data, domestic refineries ran at 83.2 to 88.9 percent between October 2007 and March 2008.
What about Big Oil? In the fourth quarter of 2007 and the first three months of 2008, Exxon Mobil alone raked in net income of $22.6 billion. Do you think it earned all that strictly through hard work and clever management? Probably not all. Suspect no. 1.
Restrictions on drilling offshore and in places like the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska may also have contributed to an imbalance between supply and demand. Skeptics point out that the fat profits of oil companies give them plenty of resources to explore for new reserves. Not to mention government subsidies. Plus the fact that ANWR would supply U.S. needs for less than 2.25 years under the best of circumstances. And yet that sounds like more than a drop in the barrel to us. Suspect no. 2.
What have we missed? Oh, yes. OPEC. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which consists of 12 sovereign nations, including Hugo Chavez's Venezuela and Ayatollah Khameini's Iran.
Congress hasn't forgotten about the most famous price-fixing, quota-setting, and consumer-gouging cartel on Earth. Earlier this month, the House of Representatives passed a bill, by a veto-proof margin (again), that would call OPEC to account for its antitrusty ways.
H.R. 6074 would amend section 1 of the Sherman Act so that it explicitly applies to restraints of trade in petroleum, natural gas, and other petroleum products. It would condemn price and supply manipulation and the like by "any foreign state, or any instrumentality or agent of any foreign state," when it acts "collectively or in combination with any other foreign state, any instrumentality or agent of any other foreign state, or any other person, whether by cartel or any other association or form of cooperation or joint action". The bill also would bar an "act of state doctrine" defense as well as one asserting foreign sovereign immunity. And it authorizes the Attorney General of the U.S. to bring an action under the new provisions and requires a task force to study stuff like price-gouging and other bad conduct in the energy industry.
H.R. 6074 does not address possibly the most important issue -- the political question doctrine. As the Fifth Circuit reminded us on May 28, in a case involving death and injury to contract employees in Iraq, that doctrine prohibits judicial action that second-guesses the conduct of the political branches -- the executive and Congress. Lane v. Halliburton, No. 06-28074 (5th Cir. May 28, 2008) (reversing dismissal of tort claims and remanding cases for further development of record). We expect that any action under the NOPEC statute would likely implicate all manner of policies -- including the invasion and administration of Iraq, the President's recent request that Saudi Arabia increase production, and the State Department's stances towards OPEC and its individual members.
Which signifies to us that NOPEC will go nowhere even if it does pass the Senate and gets past a veto. It apparently doesn't allow private litigants to sue OPEC; only the Attorney General has such authority. And even if the new President in January 2009 instructs the new Attorney General to sue under NOPEC, the political question doctrine may doom any challenge to violations that happened previous administrations. And probably post-swearing in ones too. What court can sort all that junk out?
Political theater. Don't you just love it?
Thom Weidlich at Bloomberg reports that "[a]t least 24 proposed class actions have been filed since mid-March against brokerages over claims investors were told the [auction rate] securities were almost as liquid as cash." The cases stem from the collapse of auctions that supplied liquidity for ARSs in February. Investors could no longer sell the ARSs and so couldn't get their money out.
Mr. Weidlich explains that the class actions face two serious obstacles. The first concerns the merits. Many ARSs paid interest at rates a tad higher than other "liquid" alternatives, such as a money market account. But the failure of the auctions sent them into default, which in turn triggered a contractual obligation by the issuers to pay a higher rate. An investor earning interest at the default rate may run into trouble showing that she would've gotten a better return on her money but-for her inability to get at the cash she invested in an ARS.
This damages problem likely doesn't apply to people who bought auction rate preferred securities, which don't reset to a higher return after default. But the difference between the dividends on the ARPSs and earnings on alternative investments may not amount to much.
The second roadblock relates to the requirements for treating claims on an aggregate basis in a class action. A court generally won't handle a case for damages on a class basis unless the lawyers can show, on a class-wide basis, that all class members suffered harm. Note the "class-wide basis" thing. If the nature of the class claims requires each class member to prove the fact of injury individually, class certification becomes an iffy proposition.
How does one establish class-wide harm? In price-fixing cases, plaintiffs typically do it by showing that the price fixers elevated the price by a minimum percentage -- 10 percent, say. Some class members may have overpaid more than the 10 percent, but everybody overpaid by at least one-tenth.
Securities cases do much the same thing. Experts opine that the fraud inflated the market price of the relevant stock or bond by at least such and such percentage at the time of purchase; damages represent the difference between the purchase price and the "true" value of the security.
But the collapse of auctions for ARSs didn't affect their underlying value. The issuer's ability to pay didn't change as a result of the withdrawal of liquidity from the auction market. So how can the investors demonstrate losses?
They conceivably could cite the difference between the buying price and the lower prices on secondary markets. But where will they get that information for each ARS? Unlike stocks and bonds, ARSs don't trade publicly and so purchase and sale prices don't show up in the business section of newspapers.
Conceivably an expert will find a way to calculate the minimum value of the liquidity feature of ARSs. Blawgletter shares Bloomberg's skepticism about whether such an opinion will survive defendants' savage attacks on it, but we will wait and see.
That leaves damages resulting from an investor's inability to access his funds to use for a specific purpose. He can't make his payroll, for instance. Or he has to break a contract to buy a company, a piece of land, or other investment. But such losses of profits don't happen to everyone in a class and would require proof unique to each claimant. And brokerages that sold ARSs to such people have in some cases loaned them funds to mitigate their harm. Those sorts of individual circumstances often mean no class action.
ARS investors still may pursue individual claims. The best candidates are those who couldn't get their money out in time to close a pending acquisition and lost a tidy sum as a result.
Bribery doesn't necessarily add up to securities fraud.
What happens to a company that pays $420,000 in unlawful consulting fees to a state senator whose legislative committees oversees the company's activities? Good government?
What about when the truth outs? Can you say plunge in price per share?
A 42-month series of $10,000 payments to a Tennessee lawmaker lay at the heart of a putative class action against a healthcare company for securities fraud. The complaint alleged that the bribery resulted in scandal, which produced regulatory action, which gave Wall Street heartburn, which generated a big drop in the market value of United American Healthcare's stock. Zaluski v. United American Healthcare Corp., No. 07-1298 (6th Cir. May 27, 2008).
The concatenation of events gives a clue as to why the district court dismissed and the Sixth Circuit affirmed: bribery generally doesn't violate section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. And, because it doesn't, you wouldn't expect a public company to make representations about whether or not greasing the palm of an overseeing solon has gone on.
The Sixth Circuit did a nice job of dissecting the complaint. Reminding Blawgletter of a grand old common law case -- in which one of the 19th-century English judges pronounced a statement "a mere puff" -- the court deemed a happy assurance (that the state counted the company among "viable" managed care organizations) to constitute "immaterial puffery".
But the guts of the decision emphasized the indirectness of the connection between paying bribes and a plummeting share price. The jump off a cliff doesn't kill you, the court reasoned; the sudden stop at the bottom does. Quod erat demonstrandum.
Will the ALI opt for baby steps on new aggregate settlement principles?
Remember that 1L who talked in class all the time? The one whose hand shot up even if the prof hadn't asked a question? The gunner who made you wish Socrates kept his method to himself?
Every law school section had an individual like that. If you ever wondered where they all went, speculate no more. They joined the American Law Institute. And they have gathered at The Mayflower -- the sometime home-away-from-home of a Blawgletter law classmate, Eliot Spitzer, and until Wednesday the temporary headquarters of law geekdom.
(Note the they.)
The session yesterday devoted several hours to chapters 1 and 3 in Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, Tentative Draft No. 1 (Apr. 7, 2008). Members aimed comments, criticisms, and a few barbs at the Reporter and Associate Reporters, who handled them in good cheer. The discussion produced several revisions and clarifications. It also resulted -- with a big exception -- in consensus approval of both chapters.
The sections dealing with aggregate settlements -- 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19 -- failed to gain general acceptance. At the suggestion of ALI's Director, Lance Liebman, they didn't go up for a vote. The reporters will instead revisit the provisions and present them again at the next annual meeting in 2009.
Sections 3.17-3.19 would make a major change to what people call the "aggregate settlement rule". The ASR in general invalidates an agreement by multiple clients to abide by a majority vote on accepting an aggregate settlement. Section 3.17(b)-(d) would reverse the ASR, allowing enforcement of such agreements if the joint clients knowingly consent, in writing, to an approval mechanism by a "substantial majority" of the clients.
The consensus broke down over concern that the new rule would cede undue authority to mass tort lawyers. Some commenters suggested support for the rule in the context of business litigants but worried that many personal injury claimants lack enough information and sophistication to give effective consent at the time of hiring counsel. A third group supported the rule as an improvement over the ASR, which now impels plaintiffs' lawyers to abandon representation of clients who refuse to take their share of an aggregate settlement (think fen-phen and Vioxx as examples).
We can't predict how the reporters will navigate the fault lines within the ALI, but two options look possible if not likely: First, they will build even more client protections into Sections 3.17-3.19 and, second, they will scale back their ambitions -- for now -- and deal only with classes of clients that satisfy a test for sophistication.
The latter strikes us as a prudent incremental step towards a better regime for handling settlements in aggregate litigation. If experience proves it good, the ALI and courts may extend it to other situations.